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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla.intiff and Respondent, 
-YS.-
ROLAND DEAN :McQUEEN, 
DefendanJ and Appella.nt. 
Case 
No. 9850 
BRIEF OF RESPO·NDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Roland Dean McQueen, was convicted 
upon a jury trial of the crime of robbery in violation of 
76-51-1, U.C.A. 1953, and appeals from the judgment of 
conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried jointly with George A. De-
witt in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, for 
the crime of robbery. After jury trial and a verdict of 
guilty being returned, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, 
Judge, committed the defendant to the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the appellant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS 
~ ~ '-'0~~~,~6J; ~1~tered the rear o the'!:::··. 
proximately 3:00 a.m. 111 the morning (R. 49-52) 1~: • 0 ~ • --~ 
man had a handkerchief over his nose and wore black 
kid gloves (R. 52). The other also had a handkerchief 
over his nose, but wore gloves with a cuff (R. 56, 74). 
Both were apparently wearing levis (R. 7 4-75). One of 
the men wore a pair of light moccasins (R. 76). One man 
·was taller, with a small face and carried a rifle (R. 69). 
The other, smaller man, was lighter and apparently un-
armed (R. 69). As they entered, !{ate Zimmerman, an 
employee of the Great Basin Food Service, called for 
help (R. 68). The smaller man took a butcher knife off 
the table (R. 67, 52). One of the men told ~Irs. Zimmer-
man to "hold it." (R. 52, 68) Thereafter, the only other 
employees working at the time, Duane l{eetch, ::\Iarjorie 
Pool and Pat Trujillo, entered the room (R. 50-54). The 
men asked where the money was kept, the short man 
started through the building, and then the robbers locked 
the four employees in a food locker (R. 52, 54, 78). There-
after, approximately fifteen minutes later, they ·were re-
moved from the food locker and locker in a "'ire cage 
·where they remained until they were released by a de-
livery man (R. 55). 
Pat Trujillo, one of the employees, had two dollars 
in her purse prior to the robbery. She left her purse 
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unattended and upon being released discovered a clock 
near her purse had been knocked over and that the two 
dollars that had been in her purse was gone (R. 86). 
Although all the employees were scared, they identi-
fied the appellant and George A. De Witt as the robbers 
(R. 68-70), and the gloves (Exhibit 4) of appellant were 
identified as the ones worn by one robber (R. 102). The 
moccasins were worn by DeWitt (R.104), who was appar-
ently the other robber. 
Officer Sexton of the South Salt Lake Police, took 
a statement from the appellant wherein he admitted the 
robbery, and that he took the two dollars from Pat Tru-
jillo's purse (Exhibit 2). 
The appellant at trial was defended by Kenneth 
Rigtrup, a duly licensed attorney, and his companion, 
De Witt, ·was defended by Robert McRae, also a licensed 
attorney (R. 39). Originally, Mr. McRae was appointed 
to defend both accused, and did handle both accuseds' 
cases through arraignment up to just before trial (Supp. 
R. 2). Approximately two days before trial, the appel-
lant "fired" l\Ir. ~Ir Rae, apparently because he could not 
obtain a continuance (Supp. R. 2). The court then ap-
pointed l\Ir. Rigtrup, who conferred with Mr. McRae and 
the appellant. l\Ir. McRae noted for the record (Supp. 
R. 7): 
"We discussed this matter from seven until eight 
thirty last night as well as on the telephone yes-
terday afternoon. I advised Mr. Rigtrup every-
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thing that I felt I knew about the trial and to the 
best of my ability I did. ~ow, as to what his abili-
ties in view of the short notice to defend this mat-
ter, I leave to the discretion of the Court. So far 
as my client is concerned who is still incarcerated 
in the County Jail, I would resist any joint mo-
tion for a continuance. If the Court desires to ex-
tend :Mr. Rigtrup and his client the concession of 
a separate trial and continuance, that's the dis-
cretion of the Court.'' 
The appellant stated in his own language why he 
wanted a continuance. It had nothing to do ·with the mer-
its of his guilt or innocence, but rather was merely to 
delay with hope of impressing the Board of Pardons 
(Supp. R. 3). Appellant stated: 
"vVell, what we talked about was to get out on 
bond and get it postponed for a year, year and a 
half so I could prove to the Court and Board of 
Pardons & Parole if I am found guilty of it that 
I can get a job and keep my nose clean and keep 
out of trouble and realize I have a responsibility 
no·w. * * * '' 
During the course of the trial ~Ir. Rigtrup actiYely 
participated, and as to the identity of the appellant, made 
a careful cross-examination ( R. 61-63). 
Finally, although appellant attempts to incorporate 
a record of another case into the instant appeal (State Y. 
Louden, No. 9851), no part of that record was certified 
on appeal, heard by the trial court, nor does it even in-
volve the same rrime. 
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ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COl\f~IIT ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON 
CORROBORATION OF THE APPELLANT'S 
CONFESSION. 
In appellant's first point just exactly what his con-
tention is is obscured because of a misstatement. He 
indicates that the trial court gave an instruction on cor-
roboration of a confession to which appellant excepted 
(App. Brief p. 8). This is erroneous, and what he is 
apparently attempting to say is that appellant requested 
the court to give the instruction set out in his brief, 
which was refused and to such refusal an exception was 
taken (Supp. R. 3, 4). 
If this is appellant's point, it is submitted that the 
trial court committed no error in rejecting the proffered 
instruction. It is submitted (1) that the proffered instruc-
tion was not a correct statement of the law, (2) that no 
instruction was necessary, and (3) that no prejudice 
could conceivably have resulted. 
First, it is a generally recognized principle that the 
court need not give an instruction in the language of the 
request, nor is the court obligated to give an instruction 
which is erroneous. State v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 
Pac. 737 (1891); State v. Campbell, 116 Utah 74, 208 P. 
~d 530 (1949). In the instant case, the requested instruc-
tion on corroboration of an accused's confession was not 
a proper statement of the la,v. The proffered instruction 
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would have required the jury to find ''additional corrobo-
rative evidence tending to prove that one or both of the 
defendants committed the crime of robbery." This is 
more than is necessary to corroborate a confession. Nor-
mally, all that is required is sufficient evidence to show, 
independent of the confession, a corpus delicti. State v. 
Weldon, 6 U. 2d 372, 314 P. 2d 353 (1957). It need not 
show that the particular defendant or defendants com-
mitted the crime. Thus, in 45 ALR 2d 1336, it is noted: 
"The courts agree that as a general proposition, 
evidence in corroboration of a confession or ad-
mission need not connect the defendant with the 
crime charged and that such connection can be 
shown by his confession or admission without cor-
roboration on that point. * * *" 
This court in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 
2d 1010 (1938) noted the same rule, where it was said: 
''Proof that a crime has been committed by some 
one is certainly corroborative of a confession by a 
defendant that he committed the crime, for it es-
tablishes the existence of a fact included in the 
crime confessed and essential to his guilt. * * *" 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In Williams v. Com1nonu·ealtlz, 306 Ky. 225, 206 
S.W. 2d 922 (1947), the accused raised the same conten-
tion, and the I{entucky Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument that such an instruction was proper. It noted 
that corroboration need only show a crime, but need not 
connect the defendants to it. The court stated: 
"It has been repeatedly held that an instruction 
under Section 240 is not proper or required where 
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the corpus delecti has been sufficiently established 
by other evidence than the defendant's confession, 
and that it is not necessary in. order to sustain. a 
conviction. that there be evidence tending to con-
7 d . th . t . . * * * " ( E n.ect t 1e accuse WI I s commission . m-
phasis supplied) 
In 1llan11ing v. United States, 215 F. 2d 945 (lOth 
Cir. 1954), the court noted: 
''And by the great weight of authority evidence 
of his identity as the criminal and his connection 
with the crime is not part of the' corpus delicti.' " 
The court correctly noted that to hold to the con-
trary would place the burden on the prosecution of prov-
ing all the elements of the crime by independent evi-
dence, and thus, it is arguable, that such an instruction 
would mislead the jury. As a consequence, there was 
no er~or in not giving the requested instruction. Shef-
field Y. State, 188 Ga. 1, 2 S.E. 2d 657 (1939). 
Although appellant merely claims, somewhat ambig-
uously, that it was error to fail to give the requested in-
struction, it is submitted that no instruction on the sub-
ject was in fact necessary. In State v. Weldon, 6 U. 2d 
372, 314 P. 2d 353 ( 1957), this court noted the purpose of 
the corpus delicti or corroboration rule: 
'' * * * The purpose of the rule was to safeguard 
against convicting the innocent on the strength of 
false confessions. It appears that there were sev-
eral actual cases where persons innocent of the 
crime were convicted of murder and executed and 
the supposed victims later appeared alive.'' 
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In State v. Ferry, 2 U. 2d 373, 275 P. 2d 173 (1954), 
this court stated the essence of the corroboration re-
quirement on laying a corpus delicti sufficient to support 
a conviction with a confession: 
''An accused cannot be convicted on his confession 
alone. We believe and hold that in addition there 
must be independent, clear and convincing evi-
dence of the corpus delicti, although we and the au-
thorities generally do not require it to be convinc-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
Another statement of the general rule is noted in 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 337: 
"In order to have sufficient corroboration for a 
confession, the on.ly requirement is that there be 
other facts and circumstances in evidence 
strengthening and confirming fact that crime has 
been committed with which accused identifies him-
self by his confession." (Emphasis supplied) 
In the instant case the evidence clearly shows two 
men entered the Great Basin Food Service, one carrying 
a rifle, both masked. They asked where the money was 
kept, locked the employees in a locker, searched the prem-
ises, removed two dollars from employee Pat Trujillo's 
purse, and finally reimprisoned the employees in a cage of 
the premises and fled. No part of the corpus delecti was 
uncertain as to the fact of a crime having been committed. 
It was dear that robbery had been committed. The ap-
pellant offered no contradictory testimony, nor was any 
objection as to the sufficiency of the corpus delicti eYer 
raised in the trial court, except by way of offering an 
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instruction, the obvious purpose of which was to mislead 
the jury into thinking the confession was not sufficient as 
to identity. It is submitted that under these circum-
stances there was no reason to give an instruction on 
corroboration for the confession. The general rule is 
noted is 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1231: 
"The court should properly instruct as to the law 
governing, or requiring, corroboration of an extra-
judicial confession or admission, but a failure to 
do so is not error where the confession is amply 
corroborated. Where a confession need be cor-
roborated only as to the corpus delicti to support a 
conviction, and the corpus delicti has been clearly 
proved, it is not necessary to instruct that a11 
extra-judicial confession or admission will not jus-
tify a conviction unless accompanied by proof of 
the corpus delicti; but, where it is doubtful wheth-
er a crime has been committed at all, the jury 
should be so instructed. * * * '' 
See also 53 Am. J ur ., Trial, Sec. 737 : 
* * * But, it has been held, it is unnecessary to 
instruct as to the rule requiring corroboration of 
a confession where the evidence, apart from the 
confession, fully establishes the corpus delicti.'' 
In D1tnn v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W. 2d 709 (Ky. 
1961), the appellant was charged with burglary, and 
raised on oppeal the failure of the trial court to instruct 
upon corroboration of his confession to support the cor-
pus delicti. The court rejected the contention, noting: 
"This court has consistently held that where the 
corpus delici ti has been established by evidence 
other than the alleged confession of the defendant, 
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which was done in this case, it is unnecessary to in-
struct under the foregoing Code section.'' 
Numerous cases have held that where the corpus de-
licti is adequately proved, that it is not error to refuse to 
give an instruction to the jury. People v. T'rat·is, 129 
C. A. 2d 29, 276 P. 2d 173 (1954); People v. Wilde, 82 
C. A. 2d 879, 187 P. 2d 825 (1954); Wood v. State, 142 
Tex. Cr. 282, 152 S.W. 2d 35. Recently, the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii, State v. Hale, 367 P. 2d 81 (Haw. 1961), 
discussed at length the necessity for an instruction on 
corroborating an accused's confession. In affirming the 
conviction, the court noted the instance when an instruc-
tion should be given: 
"Upon consideration of the rule established in 
Yoshida, we have concluded that when, by reason 
of incompleteness of the independent evidence, 
conflicts in the testimony, impeachment of wit-
nesses ,or other similar reasons, the confession is 
or may be a crucial part of the proof of the corpus 
delicti, it is within the province of the jury to de-
termine '''hether the independent proof shows the 
confession to be trustworthy. * * * \Ye also are of 
the view that an instruction on corroboration is 
not required in every case. * * * '' 
Since in the instant case the evidence establishing 
the corpus delicti is uncontradicted and complete, no basis 
for an instruction existed, and the court quite properly 
did not instruct on the rna tter. 
Finally, courts have held that even where an instruc-
tion may be proper, if there is substantial additional evi-
dence making out the corpus delicti, no prejudice from 
10 
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the failure to give an instruction can be claimed. Peop.Ze 
v. CltaJI Chaun, 41 C.A. 2d 586, 107 P. 2d 455. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI IS 
SUFFICIENT TO CORROBORATE THE AP-
PELLANT'S CONFESSION. 
The appellant contends the evidence of corpus delicti 
was insufficient to corroborate his confession to the crime. 
Reliance for such a view is placed on State v. Wells, 35 
Utah 400, 100 Pac. 681 (1909). Reliance upon this case is 
misplaced to the degree it is contended that the corpus 
delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt since in 
State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010 (1938), the 
\Vells rule was abandoned. Thus, in State v. Ferry, 2 U. 
2d 371, 275 P. 2d 173 (1954), the court noted: 
In State v. Wells, 1909, 35 Utah 400, 100 P. 681, 
136 Am. St. Rep. 1059, 19 Ann. Cas. 631, we held 
the independent evidence must prove the corpus 
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt; in State v. 
Johnson, 1938, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, we 
softened that rule by saying such proof need not 
be conclusive; we ennunciate the rule in our pres-
ent decision, to clarify the matter, feeling that 
such rule, already announced in Arizona in bur-
rows v. State, 8 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029, is the sound-
est of those heretofore enunciated by the authori-
ties. See also, State v. Crank, 1943, 105 Utah 332, 
142 P. 2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542." 
The rule now in effect in this state is that the cor-
roboration for corpus delicti need only be ''independent, 
11 
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clear and convincing.'' State Y. Ferry, supra; State '"· 
Weldon, 6 U. 2d 372, 314 P. 2d 353 (1957). Applying this 
standard to the instant case, it is clear that the evidence 
is amply sufficient to make out a corpus delicti. Appellant 
argues that the evidence is not sufficient to show a taking 
of personal property. Clearly there is no merit to this 
assertion, since Pat Trujillo testified that she bought 
some shrimp prior to the robbery, she had $2.00 in her 
purse at the time of the robbery, that a clock near her 
purse was knocked over and the money gone. Addition-
ally, the evidence is overwhelming that the appellant 
searched the building in an effort to find money to steaL 
Consequently, no merit at all to appellant's position exists 
on this point. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT l\1:AY NOT CO~IPLAIN OF ANY 
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SIXCE: 
A. NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH ACTIV-
ITY APPEARS OF RECORD. 
B. NO ISSUE WAS RAISED BEFORE THE 
TRIAL COURT AN"D APPELLA~T HAS, 
THEREFORE, \Y AIVED THE ISSrE. 
C. NO EVIDENCE PROCURED BY AXY IL-
LEGAL SEARCH \YAR BEFORE THE 
JURY. 
A. Appellant has attempted to incorporate by ref-
erence the record in the case of State Y. Louden, No. 9851, 
and therrhr raise an i~sne of search and seizure. No part 
of the evidence in the Louden record was eYer placed 
before the trial court, nor certified as part of the record 
12 
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on appeal. Consequently, no part of that record is con-
siderable by this court in deciding the instant case, and 
the issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Rule 77-39-12, U.R.Cr.P. as amending 77-39-12, U.C.A. 
1953; People Y. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 6 Pac. 49; State v. 
Augle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531; State v. Kinder, 381 P. 
2d 82 (Utah 1963). 
B. ~ o issue of any illegal search and seizure was 
ever raised in the trial court, during trial or by pre-trial 
motion. Although this court has not passed on the mater 
nor promulgated a rule of procedure on the appropriate 
way to proceed, 1 courts from other jurisdictions have gen-
erally held that an objection must be made either before 
trial or during trial in order to preserve the question of 
an illegal search for appellate review. 24 C.J.S., Crimi-
nal Law, Sec. 1672d comments: 
''If no objection is made in the trial court to the 
reception of evidence on the gound that it was 
wrongfully obtained, as, by illegal search and seiz-
ure, or in the course of a claimed illegal arrest, or 
by wire tapping or other violation of state or fed-
eral communication acts, the generally recognized 
rule is that the reviewing court will not consider 
such contention when it is raised for the first time 
on appeal * * *.'' 
In Gendron v. United States, 295 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir. 
1961), the court ruled : 
''On the search and seizure issue, defendant did 
not at any time make a motion to suppress the 
1 See generally Rule 41 (e) F.R.Cr.P.; Rule 41 (e) Colo. R. Cr. Procedure, 
34 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 86 (1962). 
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stolen bonds as evidence on the ground that they 
were unlawfully seized, in the manner required by 
Rule 41(3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Defendant likewise made no objection to the Gov-
ernment's offer of such bonds in evidence. In 
fact, when the Government offered said bonds in 
evidence, defendant's counsel stated, 'No objec-
tion.' Accordingly, there is no ruling of the trial 
court upon the admission of the bonds in evidence 
or upon the search an dseizure issue here for us to 
review. Billeci v. United States, 9 Cir., 290 F. 2d 
628, 629.'' 
When the United States Supreme Court again recog-
nized the exclusionary rule in federal cases in Tr eeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 383, they ruled that the illegality 
of the evidence would have to be passed upon by pre-
trial motion. Later the condition \Vas modified where 
the defendant had no prior knowledge of the illegality of 
the search before trial, Gould v. United States, 233 U. S. 
298, and further that a motion at trial would be proper 
if there ·was no dispute as to the facts, Agnello v. eniterl 
States, 269 U. S. 20; however, some objection would have 
to be made before conclusion of the case. Since no ob-
jection was made in the instant case, no basis for appel-
late review is available and the appellant must be deemed 
to have waived any objection. 
C.2 E\'en if it were admitted that there was an illegal 
search and seizure, appellant fails to show how he was 
injured by it. The comparison of the Louden record with 
the instant record does not reveal that any of the evidence 
2 The State stLbmits there was no illegal search and seizure in State v. Lou-
den. See Respondent's Brief, State v. Louden, No. 9851. 
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obtained by any search was used in this case or that it 
led to any evidence used in this case. Nor does appellant 
in his brief show such a connection. Unless the search 
culminated in producing evidence used against the ac-
cused, no harm can be claimed. Nardone v. United States, 
308 u. s. 38, 341. 
There is, therefore, no basis procedurally or substan-
tively to the appellant's claim. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS TO SEEK RE-
VERSAL BECAUSE OF ANY ILLEGAL AR-
REST SINCE: 
A. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AR-
REST WERE NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT NOR THE ISSUE RAISED 
BELOW. 
B. SUCH CLAIM WOULD AFFORD NO 
BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF APPEL-
ANT'S CONVICTION. 
A. The appellant contends that the conviction should 
be reversed because appellant's arrest was illegal. Appel-
lant apparently bases this on the Louden record which 
is not properly before the court, nor was the substantive 
issue raised in the trial court. Consequently, it is not 
now properly before this court on appeal. Peo1Jle v. 
Northrup, 21 Cal. Rptr. 448, 203 ACA 498 (1962). 
B. Even were the issue before the court, it would 
afford appellant no relief. An illegal arrest prior to trial 
15 
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is no basis to attack the court's decision convicting him 
of a crime. In lV ashington, v. Renouf, 5 U. 2d 185, 299 
P. 2d 620 (1956), the appellants sought release prior to 
trial based upon their illegal arrest and transportation 
to Utah for trial. The court denied relief, noting that al-
though the original arrest may be illegal, if the prisoner 
is held by proper legal process, thereafter he may not 
complain. Thus, the court noted: 
''The U. S. Supreme Court has held in numerous 
instances that no U. S. Constitutional provisions 
are violated by illegal, improper, or unlawful 
means of obtaining jurisdiction over the person 
of the accused where he is held under proper 
process. * * * '' 
If the appellant had in fact been illegally held, he 
rna~· have obtained relief at that time, but now having 
been convicted, he may not complain since he is properly 
held. 
Appellant does not contend that any evidence was 
illegally taken from him or that he sustained any preju-
dice by his detention. Nor does appellant cite 77-12-14, 
U.C.A. 1953, requiring that a person arrested be taken 
forthwith before a magistrate. Even if this were not 
done in this case, it could not vitiate the conviction in 
the absenc>e of a showing that it in some way depriYed him 
of a fair trial. PeOJJle Y. Guarino, 132 P. 2d 59 (1953); 
People v. Higldo1cc'r, 11 Cal. Hptr. 198, 189 C.A. 2d 309 
(1961); Pcoplr v. Jackson; 6 Cal. Rptr. 884, 183 C.A. 2d 
562 (1960); PeoJJle v. Boyd, 21 Cal. Hptr. 444, 203 ACA 
16 
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363 (1962). In People v. lmblPr, 21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 371 
P. :2d 304 (1962), the California Supreme Court noted: 
''Defendant contends that his conviction must be 
reversed because he was taken into custody on 
January 14, 1961, but was not informed of the 
charges against him until the following February 
14. Defendant was legally in custody during this 
time because he had pleaded guilty to the robbery 
in Pomona. Although he should have been taken 
before the magistrate on the murder charge with-
in the time limit prescribed in Penal Code section 
825, the failure to do so is not a ground for revers-
ing the conviction. * * * '' 
See also State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P. 2d 559 
(1951), ·where this court ruled that even though the ac-
cused had not been taken before a magistrate as required 
hy 105-12-14, U.C.A. 1943 (77-12-14, U.C.A. 1953), it 
would not compel exclusion of his confession obtained 
during this time. 
Consequently, the point raised is manifestly without 
merit. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING APPELLANT A 
CONTINUANCE. 
The appellant contends that this court should reverse 
his conviction on the grounds that his counsel at trial was 
not given adequate time for preparation. The facts on 
this point show that a warrant for arrest of the appellant 
was issued on August 17, 1962, based upon a complaint 
dated July 20, 1962 (R. 3, 6). A preliminary hearing on 
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the complaint was held on August 17, 1962, and the ap-
pellant was present and represented by Robert lYicRae 
(R. 2). An information was duly filed against appellant 
by the District Attorney on August 29, 1962 (R. 7). l'vlr. 
McRae coontinued to represent the appellant, and on 
September 4, 1962, the appellant was arraigned and plead 
not guilty. The appellant was out on bond of $2500.00 
from the time of arraignment (Supp. R. 2). On October 
10, 1962, appellant's attorney, ~ir. :McRae, was advised 
that the trial would be on November 8, 1962. He attempt-
ed to advise the appellant, who had left Utah and gone 
to Nebraska, of the impending trial date. On about K o-
vember 6, 1962, the appellant entered his attorney's office 
and said he wanted a continuance (Supp. R. 2). Because 
counsel indicated he did not believe he could get a con-
tinuance, the appellant "fired" ::Mr. ::McRae and said he 
would get counsel (Supp. R. 2, 3). ~ir. ~icRae there-
after notified the court and Kenneth Rigtrup was imme-
diately appointed for appellant. ~fr. Rigtrup discussed 
the case with Mr. McRae for about 1 lf2 hours, informed 
him of the anticipated proof, and the possible defenses . 
.Jir. Rigtrup had some consultation ·with his client also 
( Supp. R. 6-8). On November 8, 1962, a motion for con-
tinuance was made by appellant. His reasons, as distinct 
from counsel's, for wanting the continuance, were ex-
pressed as follows (Supp. R. 3): 
"\Vell, what we talked about was to get out on 
bond and get it postponed for a year, year and a 
half so I could prove to the Court and Board of 
Pardons & Parole if I am found guilty of it that I 
can get a job and keep my nose clean and keep out 
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of trouble and realize I have a responsibility 
now. * * *'' 
The court's response was as follows (Supp. R. 5): 
"In any event, it's been almost four months since 
the alleged commission of this offense and that's 
plenty long enough. This matter should be heard 
right away. Those matters you discussed just now 
in court, Mr. McQueen, as far as you making 
good and getting a job, those are matters to dis-
cuss with the probation department at such time as 
that is available to you. We can't have a contin-
uance on the merits in connection with this trial 
over long periods to prove the good intentions of 
the defendants.'' 
The court denied the motion for continuance. Appel-
lant went to trial represented by nir. Rigtrup, along with 
his co-defendant, George De Witt, who was represented 
by ~Ir. JicRae. Both Mr. Rigtrup and Mr. McRae cross-
examined witnesses and made objections, apparently 
without specific reference to their individual clients. 
Upon conclusion of the very conclusive case for the State, 
the defense for both men rested (R. 110) without putting 
on additional evidence. Based on the above, it is submit-
ted that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying a continuance. 
In State v. Mathis, 7 U. 2d 100, 319 P. 2d 134 (1957), 
this court noted : 
''The request for continuance is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court and unless 
there is plain abuse its ruling will not be dis-
turbed. * * * ' ' 
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This court has repeatedly followed the rule that the trial 
judge will only be held to have erred if in exercising hi;-; 
discretion he went beyond the bounds of reason and tlm~ 
denied the accused an opportunity for a fair trial. lc:tate 
v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P. 2d 692 (1935); State '"· 
Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750 (1936); State Y. Hart-
man, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941); State v. Tri1-
liams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 (1917); State v. Cano, 
64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 (1924); State v. Anselmo, 46 
Utah 137,148 Pac.1071 (1915). This is the rule of gen-
eral application in this country, and the courts have ruled 
that this is true even where the claim of insufficient time 
for preparation is made. Prescott Y. State, 56 Okl. Cr. 
259, 37 P. 2d 830 (1934); State v. Badgley, 140 l{an. 349, 
37 P. 2d 16 (1934). 
In State v. Penderrille, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195, 
(1954), this court cautioned as to the right of a defend-
ant to use a constitutional right, not as directly raised 
here, to delay or obstruct trial. The court noted: 
'' * * * An accused may not, however, having once 
elected to proceed with the aid of counsel for pur-
poses of delay or to obstruct the proceeding 
against him advance successfully· an insincere 
claim of his right to defend in person. * * * '' 
By the same token, an accused who is bent on contin-:-
uance for no motive reasonably connected with his trial 
should not be allowed to ''fire'' counsel and claim lack of 
preparation, thereby bringing into fruition a continuance 
that would otherwise be ,,·ithout merit. In People v. 
O'Nf'ill, 179 P. 2d 10 (Cal. .App. 1947), the defendant 
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claimed he was denied the right of counsel. The court 
noted that just before trial the accused fired the public 
defender, and elected to proceed without counsel. The 
court, in rejecting the constitutional claim, stated, ho\\T-
e\·er: 
'' * * * Appellant did not ask for a continuance for 
the purpose of obtaining counsel and if he had 
done so the trial court would not have erred in 
the circumstances existing here in refusing to 
grant the request. * * *" 
In People v. Meades, 219 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1950), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected a contention that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a continuance in 
a murder case. The court in doing so noted that although 
trial counsel had just recently been retained, he had the 
benefit of assistance of counsel who had been connected 
with the case for sometime earlier. In the instant case, 
jfr. :JicRae was present and in effect assisted, and thus 
"newly retained" counsel had the benefit of counsel \Yho 
had ample time to familiarize himself with the case. 
In State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E. 2d 520 
(1948), the accused was convicted of rape after a plea of 
not guilty. He was arrested September 13, 1948, arraigned 
the same day and counsel appointed. Counsel consulted 
with his client and trial was set for the afternoon of the 
next day. On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court 
affirmed, noting : 
''While the circumstances lend some color to the 
argument that trial was had in the court below 
with regrettable dispatch, we must perform our 
function as an appellate court with due regard for 
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the fundamental and indispensable rule that the 
record must not only show error, but also that the 
appellant '''as prejudiced thereby. * * * [Note a 
similar requirement 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953] Ordi-
narily a motion for a continuance on the ground of 
a want of time for counsel for accused to prepare 
for trial is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge, and his ruling thereon is not sub-
ject to review on appeal in the absence of circum-
stances showing that he has grossly abused his dis-
cretionary power. Relevant deisions compel the 
conclusion that an abuse of discretion has not been 
made manifest in the case at bar. * * * '' 
In Roth Y. State, 70 Ga. App. 93, 27 S.E. 2d 473, the 
court ruled 20 minutes to be adequate time for prepara-
tion in a bigamy case not presenting any unusual 
or complex issues. In the instant case, no complexity is 
shown, and although ·appellant attempts to make some 
claim to possible illegal search and seizure, the lack of 
eYidence procured in this case as a result of such a 
search, nor any attempt by co-counsel to raise the issue, 
obviously shows its lack of merit. 
Numerous cases similar to this case where an abuse 
of discretion has not been found can be cited; among a 
few are: State Y. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 {1924); 
Cannady Y. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E. 2d 241: State Y. 
If endricks, 66 Ariz. 235, 186 P. 2d 943; People Y. ~~lcNabb, 
3 Cal. 2d 441, 45 P. 2d 334; People Y. Sha.zr, 46 Cal. 2d 
768, 117 P. 2d 34; State Y. Gallo, 128 N. J. Law 172, 24 
A. 2d 557; Thompson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 5, 179 S.E. 200; 
State v. TVilson, 181 La. 61, 158 So. 621; 22A C.J.S., Crim-
inal Law, Sec. 496, p. 155. In the instant case the accused 
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fired counsel, had no substantial reason for a contin-
uance, and was adequately defended, and under these cir-
cumstances no abuse eof discretion can be claimed. To 
allow the accused to so claim would give court assistance 
to self-induced error. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' contentions on appeal, though multiple, 
are unusually unmeritorious, and this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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